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Abstract 
As industrialization has been conceived by the Malaysian government as a 
strategic means for accomplishing the development policy of national 
stability and unity, poverty eradication, ethno-economic restructuring and 
finally for achieving the status of a developed country by the year 2020, 
industrial peace has been accorded a high priority. During the 1980s and 
1990s industrial strife declined to very low levels, after an elaborate system 
for conciliation and arbitration had been put in place in the 1960s. But 
industrial peace did not equate with industrial harmony and productive 
behaviour. Adopting a policy of in-house unionism in the early 1980s, the 
Malaysian government tried out a new mechanism for securing cooperation 
and consensus at the enterprise level, focusing on the new Malay workforce 
in the modern sectors and bypassing the traditional trade unions, structured 
on industrial, occupational and trade boundaries. 
Based on three case stories from the metal industry, this article demon- 
strates that enterprise unions are not by nature docile, management- 
controlled trade unions in a Malaysian context. A certain dynamic of 
enterprise industrial relations is delineated and explained by union 
democracy and independence on the one hand and employers' policies and 
practices in terms of personnel and industrial relations management on the 
other. The labour laws and the authorities provide a framework and 
mechanisms for conflict interpretation and resolution, but a statist 
explanation of Malaysian industrial relations at the enterprise level is 
insufficient. The management-labour relationship has to be taken to the 
forefront of the analysis, which falsifies some of the myths surrounding 
enterprise unions in Malaysia.' 
In Search of Industrial Harmony 
Industrial strife predominated in Malaysian industrial relations 
during the late colonial years of the 1940s, but it was more or less 
suspended during civil war and the emergency of 1948-60. In the 
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formative years of Malaysia (established 1963) and the confrontation 
with Indonesia in 1963-65, industrial militancy returned, with more 
than 300,000 workdays lost every year in the period 1962-64 and 
over 100,000 in the following years 1965-68 (Jomo & Todd 1994: table 
2.16). The lowest level of industrial conflict was recorded in 1970 
with less than 2,000 workdays lost, but then industrial conflicts rose 
again to a peak during the economic recession of 1974-76. From the 
mid-1970s industrial strife evaporated steadily, with a minor peak of 
industrial action during the economic crisis of 1985 and an excep- 
tional single big strike in 1990 in the plantation sector with the loss 
of nearly 300,000 workdays. During the 1990s the amount of 
industrial action returned to the low level of the 1980s and even 
declined further from 23,500 workdays lost in 1991 down to 2,500 in 
1996 (pers. comm. Ministry of Human Resources (MHR) 1997). In 
short, Malaysia has achieved stable industrial peace during the last 
25 years, a period of tremendous economic, political, social and 
cultural transformations. 
Achieving industrial peace has been a major concern for Malay- 
sian governments during the post-colonial time and especially since 
racial riots in 1969 made the government reformulate the overall 
development policy. An interventionist policy was adopted in 1971, 
based on the ideology of nation-building and political unity 
(Rukunegara), the eradication of poverty and the ethno-economic 
restructuring of the Malaysian society, upgrading the Malay 
community in terms of capital, employment and education in the 
modern sectors (New Economic Policy, NEP, 1971-90). 
The general strategy emphasized rapid economic growth, industri- 
alization and employment generation, and the more specific strategies 
included positive discrimination towards Malays (quotas for 
education and employment), establishment of trust funds and state- 
owned enterprises, and export-oriented industrialization (e.g. Export 
Processing Zones; export incentives; foreign direct investments). 
Political and economic stability became a mantra in order to attract 
transnational companies and investments, and by implication, 
industrial peace was perceived as crucial for successful implementa- 
tion of the NEP. The call for industrial harmony was reiterated when 
the National Labour Policy (NLP) was announced in 1992 after the 
adoption of the National Development Policy (NDP), successor to 
the NEP and the first step towards the transformation of Malaysia 
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into a developed country by the year 2020 in accordance with the 
long-term strategy ('Vision 2020') for the period 1991-2020. 
In practice Malaysian governments have steadily narrowed the 
space for legal industrial action through labour legislation (e.g. in 
1959, 1967, 1980), establishing an industrial relations system based 
on conflict resolution through conciliation and arbitration within a 
state-dominated corporatist system consisting of the authorities 
(Ministry of Human Resources, Industrial Court, Labour Court), 
employers' associations and trade unions. 
This very thinly masked net for bringing industrial conflicts into a 
conciliation and arbitration system has been developed since the mid- 
1960s. Compulsory arbitration became introduced by decree after the 
mass strikes in 1964 and then institutionalized via amendments to the 
labour laws in 1967 after the end of the confrontation with Indonesia. 
More restrictions were added after a wildcat strike by employees of 
the Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) in 1979, which resulted in 
international sympathy actions after the Malaysian government had 
jailed trade unionists. In the end the government abolished the trade 
union of airline employees, allowing one trade union for foreign 
airline employees and one in-house union for MAS employees, before 
they finally tightened the Industrial Relations Act in 1980. 
This was the last major revision of the Industrial Relations Act. 
Today, legal and legitimate strikes and lockouts are very difficult to 
instigate because they presume either administrative mistakes or 
political acceptance of the strike - which anyway happened in 1990 
in the plantation sector. Moreover, legal strikes are only available for 
trade unions. Strikes by non-unionized employees are by definition 
illegal and thereby a matter of police prosecution. However, wildcat 
strikes take place among both non-unionized and unionized 
workers. For unionized workers, wildcat strikes have serious 
implications, providing legal justifications for employers to sack the 
persons involved and for the authorities to close down the enterprise 
union or worksite committee (earlier the whole union would be 
deregistered if a union worksite committee went on illegal strike and 
the union did not stop it immediately). Finally, collective agreements 
(CAs), registered and enforced by the Industrial Court, normally 
provide guidelines for settling industrial dispute. Although union 
membership is limited to around 10% of the workforce and probably 
with the same amount of employees being covered by collective 
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agreements (some union members do not have CAs, while employees 
are covered by the CA of the company whether they are union 
members or not), more than 60% of all industrial disputes referred to 
the authorities concern collective bargaining and contractual terms 
of collective agreements and other service contracts (Yong 1996: 206, 
table 8-10). The outcome of the compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration system is that at least 75% of all cases brought into the 
state-corporate industrial relations system were solved through 
conciliation in 1991-92 (Yong 1996: 205, table 8-7), more than 90% in 
1994, while the target of the Ministry is to achieve zero cases of 
arbitration (pers. comm. 1995). 
In sum, the Malaysian state has achieved industrial peace through 
labour legislation, administrative, conciliation and arbitration 
mechanisms and an overall development policy for rapid economic 
growth and ethno-economic restructuring. However, industrial peace, 
understood as lack of industrial actions like strikes and lockouts, is 
identical neither with industrial harmony, i.e. cooperation based on 
consensus about objectives and means at the enterprise level (Balan 
1995), nor with rising productivity. Instead, 'peace' may come from a 
culture of silence, based on authoritarianism and suppression, and this 
may again generate workplace resistance and unproductive behaviour 
and inspire to more subtle means of struggle: legal and open actions 
(e.g. refusing overtime work beyond law and collective agreement), 
covert resistance (e.g, go-slow, sabotage), or public in-house (picket- 
ing) or out-house (state conciliation and arbitration) actions. 
In order to establish a framework for industrial harmony, the 
government at first tried social corporativism. In 1975 a tripartite 
consensus formula for industrial cooperation was reached between 
the government, the labour centre (Malaysian Trades Union 
Congress, MTUC) and the employers' federation (Malayan Council 
of Employers Federation, MCEF), named the 'Code of Conduct for 
Industrial Harmony'. This tripartism did not last long, and more 
tense relations evolved again between trade unions and the 
government, reaching a peak around the MAS-conflict of 1979-80. 
Since the early 1980s the government turned to another strategy 
by applying a new policy of organizational transformation of the 
trade union movement, promoting enterprise unionism as an 
alternative to the dominant structure of national industrial unions. 
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This article aims to analyse the Malaysian policy of enterprise 
unionism within the political quest for industrial stability and 
harmony, questioning the belief that enterprise unions act more 
peacefully and cooperatively than other types of trade unions in 
Malaysia. By enterprise union I mean trade unions that organize 
employees within the same enterprise (plant, establishment, 
company corporation), while industrial unions unionize employees 
within a particular industry (or sub-industry), and national unions are 
trade unions that unionize members within a particular trade, 
occupation or industry but cover employees within the nation (in 
Malaysia to be understood as the federation (Peninsular Malaysia) or 
the confederation (Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak). 
At first the article describes the Malaysian policy of enterprise 
unionism in terms of public discourse and political-administrative 
practice. In order to prove that enterprise unions are not docile and 
loyal organizations by nature, several cases of militant enterprise 
unions are presented. Finally, the dynamics of and conditions for 
enterprise union militancy are discussed in terms of trade union 
democracy and the employers' personnel and industrial relations 
policy. The article concludes that enterprise unions are not a panacea 
for industrial harmony. On the contrary, the belief by employers and 
authorities that enterprise unions are weak and easily manipulated 
might backfire and create very tense industrial relations at the 
enterprise level - tensions which are very difficult to settle with or 
without external intervention. 
The empirical evidence on enterprise unions was collected during 
a research project, financed by the Danish Council for Development 
Research and institutionally affiliated to the Department for 
Intercultural Communication and Management. The research project 
included field research with interviews of key stakeholders of the 
Malaysian industrial relations system and more than 20 trade union 
case studies in Peninsular Malaysia 1995-96 (see Wad 1996a, 199613, 
1997a, 199%; additional and earlier writings are found in Wad 1988; 
Wad & Jomo 1994). For my field research in Malaysia in 1995 and 
1996, I obtained a research permit from the Economic Planning Unit of 
the Prime Minister's Office and I became attached to the Institute of 
Advanced Studies, University of Malaya. The Malaysian authorities in 
no way restricted my research, but a few employers refused to 
cooperate, including prohibiting me from meeting officers of the 
Peter Wad 
enterprise union. Persons and companies are accorded anonymity 
where I use information obtained directly and not available to the 
public, except where they have agreed to be identified by name or 
position. Finally, it needs to be underlined that the interviews are 
edited for reading purposes. 
The Malaysian Policy of Enterprise Unionism 
The 'in-house union' policy was launched in 1983 by Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamed, the Prime Minister since 1981. His advocacy of enterprise 
unionism followed the announcement of the 'Look East' policy in 1982, 
whereby he wanted to turn Malaysia away from a Western orientation 
of development and instead to take the East as a development model, 
emphasizing the successful economic development of Japan and, to a 
lesser degree, South Korea. 
In Mahathir's controversial book The Malay Dilemma (published in 
Singapore in 197'0, but banned in Malaysia until 1981 when he took 
over as Prime Minister) he did not completely reject the notion of 
trade unionism in relation to the pro-Malay policy, but he found 
trade unions irrelevant in the reshuffling of the Malaysian society. 
At that time Mahathir probably saw no alternative to either the 
British pattern of unionism or state protection making trade unions 
obsolete. With the expansion of Malay employment in secondary 
and tertiary sectors, Mahathir was looking for an alternative, which 
facilitated the NEP strategy of ethno-economic restructuring with 
growth without making the Malaysian labour institutions obsolete. 
Japan turned out to be a relevant model for development: 
Our Look East policy is directed not so much at investment from 
Japan but at acquiring the kind of policies, systems and work ethics 
that the Japanese have. We see the Japanese have made headway 
while the West. . . appears to be regressing. So in order for Malaysia 
to progress, we have to learn from the better example. This is why 
we now want to Look East where before we were looking West (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 11.6.1982). 
In 1983 he argued that Malaysia had to change the core organiza- 
tional component of its industrial relations system to fit the 
development requirements of Malaysia: 
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There is a need for Malaysia . . . to look into a new concept like in- 
house unions that have been used successfully by the Japanese 'who 
have easily beaten the West' which practises the old system of trade 
unionism (New Straits Times, 6.3.1983). 
Besides advocating in-house unions because they were part of the 
successful Japanese system, Mahathir also legitimized enterprise 
unionism by emphasizing the particular situation of new industries and 
companies to be established in Malaysia in order to secure development: 
Some of our companies . . . have just been set up and are coming up 
but if forced to pay the same benefits as the more successful ones 
will definitely not succeed. Hence . . . it would be more meaningful 
for these firms, especially the new ones, to have in-house unions 
which have proved to be a big success in Japan . . . by having a 
union within a firm, the union could negotiate with the 
management concerned, while taking into consideration the various 
circumstances. And with workers totally involved in the company, 
which would result in increased productivity and higher profits, all 
sectors would benefit, including the Government through revenue. 
It would therefore be more meaningful . . . for the thousands of 
workers in firms and not represented by unions to have in-house 
unions (New Straits Times, 6.3.1983). 
In the eyes of the government enterprise, unionism appeared as a 
triple-win formula, benefiting employers, employees and the state. 
Moreover, it fits with the needs of workers in non-unionized enter- 
prises, industries and sectors and especially in newly established 
companies. Argued that way, 'latecomer' industrialization with infant 
industries and expanding Malay employment in the modern sectors 
called for enterprise unionism without substituting industry-based 
unions in the old industries with Indian and Chinese labour. 
During a public debate on the necessity of amending the Trade 
Union Act under the economic recession of the mid-1980s, the 
authorities argued that enterprise unions were particularly relevant 
in bigger companies where their membership can be large enough to 
protect against exploitation. National unions would still be appro- 
priate and effective in small and medium-size companies and within 
the primary sector (the plantations) where they are 'very established 
and efficient' (New Straits Times, 31.7.1987, quoted in Latiff 1988: 50). 
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Simultaneously, a dispute between a national union and a newly 
formed in-house union in the banking industry disclosed that 
enterprise unions were non-existent in a legal sense, because the 
concept was not used or defined in the labour laws. After a Supreme 
Court award in 1988, won by the National Union of Bank Officers 
and dissolving an in-house union within the jurisdiction of the 
national union, the government immediately changed the Trade 
Union Act legalizing enterprise unions. Hereafter, an enterprise 
union was legally defined as a trade union of employees within a 
particular establishment, i.e. 'any place of business or employment 
belonging to an employer and includes any division or branch 
thereof' (Trade Union Act 1959 and Regulations, 1995, Part I, section 2). 
The rationale for promoting and institutionalizing enterprise 
unions was very much the same in 1995 as it was in 1983 and 1987: 
In the early eighties, the Government announced its policy of 
encouraging the formation of in-house unions. This in-house union 
concept which followed on the heels of the Government's Look East 
policy was intended to spur worker loyalty to enterprise and enhance 
closer employer-employee ties for the well-being of the company and 
the nation as a whole. In-house unions are inevitably better 
acquainted with and committed to the objectives and operation of the 
establishment in which the members work. This would facilitate 
smoother negotiations and collective bargaining between labour and 
management. The tendency for the national unions to exert pressure 
in securing uniform wage rates and other conditions of employment 
may produce a negative effect on the continued growth and viability 
of small and medium sized or newly established industries (Ministry 
of Human Resources, mirneo, 1995: 5). 
The Ministry argued that in-house unions facilitate industrial 
harmony between the employer and the employees to the well-being 
of all concerned parties (the employer, the employees and the 
society). The behaviour of the employees and the union will be more 
responsible as the in-house union becomes more loyal to and gains 
better knowledge about the company's situation and objectives. 
Moreover, a negative sanction operates as well: contrary to national 
union officers, in-house union leaders work in the company and will 
lose their jobs if the company goes bankrupt. In sum, the govern- 
ment takes a positive stance towards the concept of in-house unions 
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relative to other types of unions, promoting the idea as expressed by 
an officer of the Ministry of Human Resources: 
We encourage in-house unions because they know better the 
requirements of the workers and the company. The workers will not 
be represented by aliens to the company (interview 1995). 
Still, the Ministry of Human Resources recognizes that industrial 
conflicts are endemic to industrial relations: 
Industrial grievances are common whether or not [there are] in-house 
unions, national unions or no unions. Due to the overall structure of 
industrial relations there are bound to be conflicts. But in-house union 
leaders will be more responsible. Capable leaders will also continue in 
office (Muustry of Human Resources, mirneo, 1995). 
Regarding policy implementation, the Ministry of Human Resources 
takes a pragmatic approach to most issues, meaning that the officers 
try to delegate most cases to the parties involved (the national labour 
centres, the MTUC and the MLO (Malaysian Labour Organization) 
(1989-96), and the national association of employers, the MEF). The 
Ministry advises employees who want to set up in-house unions to 
visit the MTUC or MLO in order to get advice and support. It wants 
to intervene as little as possible and to refrain from forcing regula- 
tions upon managers, unions and employees. 
The promotion of in-house unions follows this norm of pragmatism: 
'We encourage workers to form in-house unions, but we do not want 
to force or phase out national unions. It is up to the workers to 
decide (Interview 1995).' The Ministry is aware of certain weaknesses 
of enterprise unions, and especially two aspects are highlighted: First, 
in-house unions are small and financially fragde; second, during 
negotiations workers come face to face with their own bosses and may 
feel subordinated, impeding negotiations between equals as in the 
case of national union leaders and managers. Therefore, it is argued, 
the Ministry ought to and does take more care of in-house unions 
compared to national unions. In fact, the Ministry considers how the 
weaknesses of the in-house unions could be mitigated, although it 
admits that it does not know very much about what is going on 'out 
there' (interview 1995). The Ministry recognizes that in-house unions 
need more training and education, and the Ministry is presently 
looking into the matter (interview 1995). The confinement of in- 
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house unions to establishments within particular industries, trades 
or occupations is also under review. 
In sum, the policy of enterprise unionism looks like an innovative 
approach (organizational restructuring) for achieving industrial 
harmony. Relying on ideological and administrative means, and 
appealing especially to the new Malay workforce in bigger compa- 
nies, it deviates from the traditional Malaysian labour policy of tight 
labour laws to facilitate industrial peace. The policy did not 
explicitly aim for the extermination of the existing national unions, 
but focuses on the (unorganized) new and upcoming workplaces 
and workforce. Moreover, the government assumes that enterprise 
unions provide for an enterprise perspective and loyalty which assist 
enterprise-based cooperation and collective bargaining, improving 
productivity and reducing the risk of industrial tension turning into 
work stoppages. It is not only employers and workers who would 
win by solving the problems in-house; the state would gain, too, in 
terms of increased revenues. The concept of enterprise unionism 
promised a triple win-win-win scenario of industrial harmony, but 
does it meet these expectations in practice? 
This interpretation of the government's in-house union policy is 
contested, not least by the MTUC. Criticizing the policy of enterprise 
unionism of the 1980s, the late President of the MTUC, P.P. Naraya- 
nan, held that the government got the 'enterprise union' concept 
wrong, forgetting the lessons of the 1950s when in-house unions 
were infiltrated by outsiders (anti-national elements, irresponsible 
politicians) and workers became unmanageable for investors as well 
as for authorities, forcing the government to rely on the sober and 
stable leadership of national unions (Latiff 1988: 54). However, this 
interpretation of Malaysian trade union history does not fit the facts 
because much strike activity was initiated by national unions against 
employers resisting unionization of their company (Jomo & Todd 
1994: 93-96). However, it is correct that Malaysian enterprise 
unionism predates the 'Look East' policy, even back to the turbulent 
years of late colonialism, but in-house unionism was not promoted 
by the government before the 1980s. 
The present General Secretary of the MTUC, G. Rajasekaran, 
drives home another argument, by saying that the government 
creates a lot of obstacles for the national unions and their effort to 
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unionize employees, implying that at least in practice it has not been 
possible to establish a new national union since the inception of the 
enterprise union policy in the early 1980s, and that there is no free 
choice between joining national unions and enterprise unions, 
because in-house unions are treated preferentially by the Ministry of 
Human Resources and the government (interview 1997). The 
General Secretary is right when we talk about the component 
electronics industry, and when he talks about national unions being 
obstructed by the authorities when they try to unionize companies. 
But in other cases do the authorities, the Industrial Court and the 
civil courts act in accordance with the claims of the national unions? 
The picture of Malaysian industrial relations is not black and white 
regarding the relationship between the trade unions and the govern- 
ment. Focusing so much on the state's policy and practice, the policies 
and practices of the employers are pushed into the background or 
deliberately overlooked. And it is indeed the relationship between the 
employers and the trade unions which needs to be placed in the 
limelight if we want to understand what is going on (Wad 199%). 
Enterprise Unions and Industrial Militancy in Malaysia 
Based on the pre-1980s experiences, the Malaysian government 
might have been right in their judgement that enterprise unions are 
more docile and collaborative than the national unions. No enter- 
prise union is publicly known for its militancy before 1980. In fact, it 
seems that enterprise unions turned militant after the announcement 
of the Look East policy and the endorsement of the policy of 
enterprise unionism! Two examples: 
s The employees of an old rubber manufacturing company took 
control of the management-dependent in-house union in the early 
1980s and forced the management to recognize the union and 
accept collective bargaining. The ongoing management-labour 
conflicts and the declining demand for manufactured rubber 
products caused mass retrenchment in 1983, suspending produc- 
tion for several months. The Hong Kong Chinese-owned factory 
was only saved by being acquired by a domestic Chinese com- 
pany, which brought in new capital, technology and management. 
The new management also took a new industrial relations ap- 
proach, recogruzing the legitimacy of the in-house union, making 
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company performance more transparent and establishing bar- 
gaining procedures on productivity-based wage schemes. 
In another large rubber product manufacturing company, an 
in-house union was established in 1968 after the worksite com- 
mittee of the national union had been deregistered during a 
wildcat strike. The management was supportive of the formation 
of a new union, being used to collective bargaining at the enter- 
prise level. Employees controlled the enterprise union during the 
1970s, and a house was bought for use as a union office. When 
tensions increased between management and labour during the 
early 1980s due to the recession and retrenchment, the union 
leadership used controversial actions during collective bargaining. 
The management dismissed them for taking illegal action, but the 
Industrial Court ruled in favour of the union leaders, forcing the 
company to reinstate them. However, during the next round of 
retrenchment the union leaders volunteered for retrenchment, 
feeling that a new batch of leaders had to take over after the 
situation of the company had changed radically. In order to carry 
the decision through, one of the former leaders stayed as paid 
union officer with the objective to train and assist the new, young 
and inexperienced union leaders. The strategy succeeded, and the 
union leadership has confidently handled union affairs ever since, 
including tough negotiations on more flexible working hours 
demanded by management since 1996. 
Are these two cases from the rubber manufacturing industry 
exceptions from a normal pattern of docile enterprise unions? In order 
to understand the dynamics of enterprise unions, we shall take a look 
at some in-house unions in another industry, namely the metal 
industry (here delimited to the steel and metal products industries). 
The steel and metal product industries are primarily home market, 
non-Malaysian, resource-based industries, compared to the rubber 
product industry which is a Malaysian, resource-based and export- 
oriented industry. The industries are within the jurisdiction of a 
national industrial union, the Metal Industry Employees' Union 
(MIEU), which operates mostly within the metal product industry. 
In the integrated steel mill industry it has unionized two (Antara 
Steel, AM Steel) out of four steel mills, counting around 700-900 
members out of a total union membership of over 12,000 members, 
or less than 8% of its total membership. The two steel mills outside 
100 Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 12 0 97 
Enterprise Unions: Panacea for Industrial Harmony in Malaysia? 
the domain of the national union are the Malayawata Steel Mill, with 
an in-house union, and the Perwaja Steel Mill, without any trade 
union. The Perwaja Steel Mill, a state-owned company, is presently 
being restructured because it is de facto bankrupt due to a number of 
factors: mismanagement, corruption, the failed transfer of Japanese 
steel technology, the wrong geographical location, etc. 
In the following section three in-house union case stories are pre- 
sented. These in-house unions changed from a more cooperative, 
management-oriented policy to a more militant, member-based policy. 
In a metal product factory (company A), a management-initiated in- 
house union turned into a militant union fighting for better terms of 
employment. In an integrated steel mill (company B) a cooperative 
enterprise union went through leadership changes and fought the 
management in order to improve wages and working conditions, 
ending with picketing, retrenchment and the return of former leaders. 
Finally, the radicalism of union leaders in another steel mill (company 
C), ended with the fall of the enterprise union and the return of the 
national union, which became recognized by the management. 
Company A 
The company began operations in 1958, manufacturing plain cans 
and boxes for biscuits, cooking oil and kerosene (Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange 1995). Five years later it started producing litho- 
graphed tin cans and boxes. In the mid-1980s, the company 
diversified into carton manufacturing and services for the packaging 
industry, expanded into beer and beverage cans manufacturing for 
home and world markets, and acquired a plastic-bottle manufactur- 
ing business. In 1989 it began producing two-piece aluminium 
beverage cans for domestic and export markets. In the 1990s it 
expanded and upgraded manufacturing technology for colour 
printing and aluminium-can making. The turnover of the company 
has increased steadily in spite of fluctuating macro-economic trends. 
The company is part of a business group of ten companies con- 
trolled by a domestic Chinese family. It has been a public listed 
company since 1984, and the family control is centred in a holding 
company, formed in 1982. This control is now in question owing to a 
family feud, dating back to the restructuring of the company prior to 
public listing (Far Eastern Economic Review, 15.2.1996). The two 
factions of the family are each headed by sons of the founding father 
and his first wife. One son, being Executive Director and the 
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mastermind of the expansion of the company into the leading 
position of the packaging industry, is trusted by most family 
members. The other son is Managing Director, contending that the 
shares be sold en bloc in order to secure a higher price (by selling a 
controlling share), and in the same stroke precluding the possibility 
that the other faction might assume control of the company. 
The management-initiated formation of the in-house union in the 
mid-1980s came about when employees attempted to join the 
national union (MIEU). The management became aware of this and 
wanted to prohibit the company workforce from being controlled by 
an external trade union. The management used all means available 
to keep the union out. Realizing that it was impossible, the manage- 
ment persuaded some employees, primarily supervisors and clerical 
staff, to start an in-house union, assuming that a national union is 
very strong while an in-house union is weak and manageable. The 
in-house union became quickly registered by the Registrar of the 
Trade Unions (RTU) and immediately recognized by the manage- 
ment. In the view of the present union leadership, the enterprise 
union was born in the following way: 
What happened was that in 1984 a group of workers from this 
company had the intention to form a union. They got help from a 
national union which is called MIEU, Metal Industry Employees' 
Union. These people helped the group of workers here to join the 
national union. That is what happened. When that happened - when 
the workers tried to form a union - the management came to know 
about it. They were against it. They found ways and means to stop it 
happening. In 1985 the management decided that instead of having a 
national union here they intended to have an in-house union. What 
they did was to quickly call a group of workers who were on their 
side and pick them up as a pro tem committee and these people 
formed the in-house union. They quickly wrote in all the forms and 
everything to the RTU, the Registrar of the Trade Unions under the 
government, who immediately approved the formation of the in- 
house union. In 1985 we formed an in-house union and had the first 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) at the beginning of 1986. At that 
time there were 250-300 members (interview 1995). 
The Executive Secretary of the MIEU describes the means used by the 
management and the RTU to overcome the claim of the national union: 
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IP (intervimee): The workers joined us actually. When the 
membership check was carried out by the RTU the company went 
and applied for an in-house union and they even told us that they 
had already recognized the union. There was again the same 
dispute about who made the application first. We told the Registrar 
that he could not register the other union before our matter was 
resolved. Resolved in the sense that when they carried out the ballot 
we had 44%. There again we are not satisfied, because this company 
has within their group another factory engineering products, 
making machine tools, another one making paper cartons, all 
different, separate companies. But when they sent the papers on the 
membership check they took all of them together. If they had sent 
only the can factory we would have had a majority. 
P W  (Peter Wad) :  How can they do this when they are separate 
factories? 
IP: The government does not check the problem, you see. They keep it 
confidential. They don't tell us. They come, collect our records and 
check ow records. But as far as the company is concerned, whatever 
they receive they just accept. We said, please check on that. We wrote 
to the company and said 44% voted for the union. The company said 
that they would not recognize~it. Next day they recognized this [in- 
house] union immediately because there were very good connections 
between [the company] and the MCA, the Chinese party which is a 
coalition partner in the ruling government. They are very close with 
the Minister. It is our view that the Minister intervened. 
PW: Whom could they get to stand for the in-house union? The 
supervisors? 
IP: Yes, the supervisors. They had a very small membership. As I 
said, at that particular company we had much more than 50%. Then 
the moment our claim was rejected when they registered the union 
and the employer immediately recognized the union, after that we 
disputed, we complained, the procedure was not proper, the 
Minister just dragged his feet. They even concluded a collective 
agreement very quickly and registered it. This happened to us. 
PW: Did you lose contact with this factory or do you still keep in 
touch with these former members? 
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IP: Sometimes they came back for advice. Later on they said, well 
the in-house union is there, we will go and join in and try to take the 
leadership, and put our own independent people there. So we said 
all right, go ahead and give them some support. They set off, and 
this is still going on (interview 1995). 
Some years later, a group of rank-and-file members, primarily 
production workers, changed the leadership into the present one, 
composed entirely of technical, transport and production people, 
with no supervisors or clerks in the executive committee except for 
one woman from a subsidiary factory, covered by the union. In the 
words of the present leader of the enterprise union: 
What happened was that the old guys were there from 1986. I 
would say the union was not active in terms of getting benefits for 
the workers. Those guys were only there to run the union and it 
went on like that. There were no changes. They did not really look 
into what the needs of the workers were. Then came a group that 
thought that they would be better off by giving so many benefits. 
What happened was that they threw the old guys out and they took 
over. That was in 1989. Immediately when the new guys were in, in 
the space of three to four months', we got affiliated to the MLO 
[Malaysian Labour Organization]. When we got affiliated to them, 
we got all the help they could give us, because in terms of 
knowledge to run the union, these new guys were very 
inexperienced. When we got affiliated to them they helped us with 
so many things, giving us information, they had their own library, 
conducted courses for us, and all this. After that we came up all the 
way (interview 1995). 
Although the management was unhappy with the new independent 
union leadership, they never tried to dismiss union officials. Several 
supervisors and clerical officers resigned from the union. Only 
recently, the union came to learn that some supervisors cancelled 
their membership after being threatened by the management, but 
they returned after the union intervened on their behalf. 
The in-house union joined the MLO. Being formed in 1989 as a 
splinter labour centre and in dire need of affiliates compared to the 
MTUC (to which the MIEU is affiliated), the MLO contacted many 
enterprise unions to mobilize support. The MLO assisted the in- 
house unions that were affiliating, including the union of company 
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A, in preparation and negotiation techniques of collective bargain- 
ing, training members of the executive committee. The first collective 
bargaining after the breakaway from management control covering 
the CA-period 1992-94 quickly deadlocked and was referred to the 
Industrial Court by the Minister of Human Resources after concilia- 
tion by the labour authorities. 
During this period of collective bargaining, the management 
barred the whole executive committee in the factory when the union 
leaders held an emergency meeting at the union office inside the 
plant, after the management refused to meet the demands of the 
union. The union officials had to call for help, and the police arrived 
and took the union leaders to the police station where they reported 
the incident. Then, the union leadership decided to stage a picket in 
front of the factory after working hours. When the management tried 
to prevent this by parking lorries at the nearest side of the street, the 
workers moved the picket across the road and into the shadow of 
some large trees. Then management had the trees cut. The next day 
workers prevented the management from parking the lorries blocking 
the picket. They picketed for five days, calling on passing drivers to 
sound their horns in sympathy, which they did. Newspapers also told 
the story of the industrial conflict. Finally the Industrial Court ruled 
in favour of the union with a 10% wage increase across the board 
plus other benefits, backdated for more than a year. The union 
encouraged the members to donate 10% of the arrears to the union, 
and the union itself donated RM5000 to the MLO in appreciation of 
its support. 
After this confrontation, the management changed its attitude for 
a while. Union officials were allowed to conduct union affairs in the 
union office, located in the factory, but it was voluntary and took 
place outside working hours. The union leaders felt that they had 
proved that an in-house union has to be and can be a strong union. 
The power struggle went on, however. During the new round of 
collective bargaining for the 1995-97 period, the management again 
tightened the surveillance of the union (e.g. checking the union 
office and their presence). Now the union leaders just tell the 
management that they have to do the work during working hours 
because the building is closed at 6 p.m. 
The CA negotiation in 1995-96 again reached deadlock, and the 
case was sent for conciliation to the Department of Industrial 
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Relations of the Ministry of Human Resources. This time a compro- 
mise was achieved before the case was sent for arbitration (or, in 
theory, industrial action). The company would only give a 5% wage 
increase (while the union wanted more than 10%). The compromise 
was 8-10% wage adjustment (depending on the wage level) plus two 
months' bonus (the normal level at present). However, the CA was 
not immediately endorsed by the Industrial Court because two 
paragraphs were not in accordance with the labour laws. The 
management secured anyway for the employees to receive back 
payment of wages for the period before the court settlement. 
The union has unsuccessfully tried to organize two neighbouring 
plants belonging to the business group but the RTU prevented them 
from unionizing the aluminium-box manufacturing plant, arguing 
that this industry was outside their jurisdiction. The National Union 
of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (NUPCW) tried to unionize the 
plastic-can factory. The management claimed that the employees 
had better terms now without a union and threatened that they 
would remove the benefits in the case of unionization. The no-union 
votes counted 65%. Some of the union activists have since left due to 
harassment (interview 1996). 
The Personnel Manager of company A, having experiences with 
one of the non-unionized factories of company, contends that it is 
much easier for management to run a company without a union. 
However, from the viewpoint of the personnel department, which 
has the objective to improve the conditions of the personnel (keeping 
them in the company in a full employment area), the anti-union 
stance is detrimental. The company has a very high turnover despite 
having recruited a new batch of Bangladeshi workers (keeping their 
passports due to unfinished procedure). In the personnel depart- 
ment they very much want an improved personnel policy, but top 
management is tough and anti-union for the time being. 
In sum, the in-house union has jurisdiction over four out of ten 
companies within the family business group (one of these compa- 
nies, located far away from the core company, is closing down due 
to rationalization). Since the management-picked leadership was 
kicked out of office by the members, the management has fought the 
union but the union leadership responded with a more militant and 
tough policy and made the management understand that it had the 
power to withstand the pressure, thereby opening the way for 
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mutual recognition and collective bargaining. One company in the 
business group is unionized by the national union, the MIEU. The 
explanation provided by the MIEU is that the MIEU was already 
present when the family acquired the company, and the General 
Manager, a younger son, takes a more cooperative approach to the 
union than his elder brothers in charge of company A (interview 
with the Executive Secretary of the MIEU, 1996). 
Company B 
The company was incorporated in 1961 and opened its steel mill in 
1967, composed of a rolling mill, a blast furnace and an oxygen 
plant. The company was a joint venture between a state company 
(PERNAS) and a Japanese steel manufacturer (Nippon Steel) using 
Japanese technology and management skills for steel production 
during the startup. Before the world recession of 1974-75 the 
company expanded, constructing a second blast furnace, a second 
oxygen plant, a wire-rod mill and extended the existing rolling mill. 
With the state-led heavy industrialization programme for the 1980s, 
the state-controlled company expanded again, constructing a second 
rolling mill. Then the economic recession (in the steel industry 1984- 
87) forced the government to scale down its policy of heavy 
industrialization, since it faced excess capacity in the steel industry 
and lack of money for investment. After the economy picked up 
from 1987 the company enlarged its paid-up capital in 1990, 
doubling it to around RM135 million. 
In 1992 the company commissioned a new steel-making plant 
(wire-rod mill using Swedish technology), which began operations 
in 1995. However, due to increased competition in the bar and wire- 
rod market of the booming construction industry, profit and 
turnover started declining in 1993/94 and 1994/95 respectively. In 
1996 the company decided to close the two old blast furnaces, and 
the subsidiary charcoal company that supplied the furnaces ceased 
operations. This rationalization implied retrenchment of more than 200 
of the 1,435 employees of the company (December 1985) plus the 
employees of the charcoal subsidiary (company reports, Kuala Lurnpur 
Stock Exchange 1996, interviews and documents 1995,1996). 
In the mid-1990s the company is still a state-controlled, limited 
company, rationalizing existing production systems (six plants in the 
same site and the charcoal subsidiary) and diversifying (into 
property and palm oil) in order to offset increased competition, 
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increase the profit and reduce dependence on Japanese steel 
technology. Moreover, the closure of the blast furnaces will reduce 
negative environmental impact in the urban-industrial area, which is 
heading for high-technology. 
An enterprise union was registered in 1970, immediately affiliat- 
ing itself to the MTUC, then to the International Metalworkers' 
Federation (IMF) and the IMF-Malaysian Council. The employees at 
first wanted to become members of the national union of the metal 
industry (MIEU), but their claim was opposed by management and 
rejected by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Instead they formed an in- 
house union, covering the steel company, but not the charcoal 
subsidiary. 
For many years the management-union relationship was amicable 
and effective in terms of solving problems in-house. Only two or 
three cases went to the Industrial Court for settlement. During the 
recession of the 1980s the company refrained from forcing mass 
retrenchment while the union agreed to prolong existing collective 
agreements, abstaining from annual bonuses. However, when the 
economy picked up after 1987 and the company started making 
profit again, the union and employees expected that their pay and 
conditions would improve too. The management refused to meet 
these expectations and claims. The dissatisfaction among union 
members turned against the leadership of the union. When the 
General Secretary was promoted to Technical Officer after having 
worked ten years in the union office, he was challenged at the bi- 
annual general assembly (BGA) in 1991 by a rank-and-file candidate 
without union leadership experience at all, and he lost. At the next 
BGA (1993) the President lost too, ending a term of office that had 
begun way back in 1975. Meanwhile, the former General Secretary was 
persuaded to stand as a candidate for vice-presidency and was elected. 
The former President returned to presidency in 1994, when his 
predecessor left the company in frustration. In the BGA (1995), the old 
President abstained from candidacy while the Vice-president went for 
h e  presidency, and this time he lost. A new, more militant leadership 
had finally taken over the key leadership positions of the union. 
Paralleling the radicalization of the union leadership, the new 
collective bargaining ran into deadlock. The collective agreement 
expired in 1994. When management would not fulfil the demands of 
the union, the union tried to bypass the management by addressing 
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the board. When this failed they resorted to picketing for the first 
time during collective bargaining. The case was referred to the 
Industrial Court for arbitration after conciliation had failed. Before 
the award of the Industrial Court, the management announced mass 
retrenchment, due to rationalization of production. This retrench- 
ment affected part of the union leadership (the President and several 
executive council members). Then, the General Secretary volun- 
teered for redundancy, too, arguing that 'when the boys have to go, I 
must go with them'. Family responsibilities (for hospitalization) 
forced him to secure a lump sum which he could get from the 
redundancy benefits, and he had also been offered another job. 
When the management accepted, the top leaders of the militant 
group of workers left the company, paving the way for a comeback 
of the older leadership, and some of them returned, including the 
General Secretary of the 1980s. This veteran explained his perception 
of in-house unionism and his attitude to the management in the 
following way: 
In those days, when the in-house union started, everybody was 
saying that it was a yellow union. In-house unions were regarded as 
yellow unions because when the companies face unions, you don't 
have the guts and negotiating power and all that. As I said earlier, 
the union managed to maintain its financial standing, and we 
established very close relationship with the management. We did 
not agree on everything but we got certain benefits from the 
management. For example, the check-off system whereby we 
deduct our dues. If we were to do it ourselves we would have a 
problem. A check-off system is very important. Without a check-off 
system the union would have a problem. Number two, sometimes 
we use the company cars going out to visit our members at hospital, 
personnel officers and all that. Therefore, we thank the management 
all these years. We created an understanding between the two 
parties: 'If you respect me, I respect you,' and that is the good 
relationship we have. Whenever we ask for any time off for coming 
over to the union office outside the factory, there is no problem. The 
management will let us go. What the management has let us 
understand all these years is that when you talk to a unionist, you 
are talking to a group of wise men, well trained and understanding, 
and that this is better than tallsing to a guy who knows nothing. If 
the union has problems, for example misunderstanding among the 
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union members, the management will face the problem. They 
understand it and they have learned this lesson in all these years. If 
you have a strong union leadership, it is better than having a weak 
leadership, because then the company will have a problem. All the 
time they will have problems with the workers: if there are no 
leaders to guide the workers, then the management will have 
problems. This is the reason behind all these years of talking with 
the management, the personnel manager and all that because they 
understand us very well. Of course when it comes to wage 
negotiations and all that, then that depends on the profits of the 
company (interview 1995). 
The management contended that the retrenchment exercise was 
neither a reprisal for the CA conflict, nor targeted at the new 
leadership. However, the management preferred the former General 
Secretary to come back as President, which he was entitled to as he 
had contested the position during the last election. The management 
thought that he was a better choice because he not only looked after 
the interests of the workers but also took notice of the performance 
of the company. 
In sum, the industrial relations between the management and the 
enterprise union changed for the worse when management deviated 
from the accepted dictum that 'we share the good times and the bad 
times'. The workers felt that they had made concessions during the 
bad times of the 1980s and had legitimate demands for improve- 
ments during the 1990s. When these did not materialize, the union 
membership radicalized and elected more militant leaders. How- 
ever, implementing a tough and confrontational policy and fulfilling 
the promises were not easy. Two top unionists left the company 
voluntarily, and with plant closure the whole radical leadership fell 
apart, paving the way for a return of more pragmatic and collabora- 
tive leaders. 
Company C 
This company, a steel mill, is the core business of a huge Chinese 
family business group from Singapore. The family started manufac- 
turing steel products in the 1930s and established a branch in 
Malaysia in the 1950s. In the late 1960s and 1970s the group began 
diversification into steel storage products and wire-rod milling, 
combined with foreign direct investment (Indonesia). In the early 
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1980s the company installed a scrap iron meltshop to produce steel 
billets, integrating backwards. During the economic recession in the 
mid-1980s the company diversified into other sectors, covering 
assembling and marketing of motorcycles and vehicles, engineering, 
construction, property, trading, finance, agriculture, aquaculture and 
retailing. Due to increased production and diversification, the 
company's turnover tripled from 1984 to 1988 and so did its 
workforce (from 3,000 to 9,000 employees). Although it stagnated for 
the next couple of years, a new upturn took place during the 1990s, 
where the business group expanded every year, more than doubling 
turnover while the labour force increased to more than 14,500. The 
steel mill expanded its workforce from 300-400 in the mid-1980s to 
more than 500 ten years later, with a rolling mill capacity of 850,000 
m/t per year compared to 400,000 in 1982 (Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange 1996; company report 1988). 
In the mid-1990s the business group restructured into eight 
divisions and redesigned the management style from boss-centred to 
team-centred, based on a professional staff. The Managing Director, 
with no higher education, employed professional people as advisors 
and managed in line with his recipe of doing business: entering 
markets when they are down, buying when things are cheap. This is 
a risky business strategy and now the company goes for consolida- 
tion instead of diversification (interview 1996). 
The in-house union of company C only existed for a short period, 
1983-87. The union was initiated by the management when the 
MIEU knocked at the factory gate, and it dissolved due to militant 
action taken by the in-house union. A quarrel between management 
and union over Muslim holidays saw the demise of the in-house 
union in 1986. The union leaders wanted two days off for the whole 
workforce while the management would only allow one day in 
order to run the steel mill continuously. The union leadership then 
initiated a wildcat strike where workers downed tools. Having 
ignored the conciliation and arbitration procedures outlined by 
labour law, the strike was deemed illegal and the management took 
the opportunity to sack the whole leadership of the union -fourteen 
executive council members in all. The case was taken to the labour 
authorities and settled out of court with compensation paid by the 
company. The union became defunct but it was not deregistered. 
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Because of a lot of workplace problems many employees felt that 
they needed a union. They turned to the MIEU for membership and 
support, and this time the MIEU managed both to unionize the 
workforce and to get the recognition of the management. The 
Executive Secretary of the MIEU explained the case: 
The company had initially established that union because our union 
was there and they were worried that we would go in, so they 
themselves established a union with their own people. But over the 
years, with independent elections, you can't keep on influencing the 
members and keep the puppets of management there. It won't work 
too long. At some point the workers will decide and put in the 
people they want. When that happened the management normally 
found out that it was uncomfortable to work with them. So the 
workers joined us, The company had to deal with us (interview 1995). 
The present MIEU worksite committee holds that the enterprise 
union could not solve the problems because it was on its own 
without any training and skills in union matters. However, things 
have not improved dramatically since the MIEU took over. Today 
the pay and working conditions are still unacceptable, and living 
conditions have even worsened during the last three years, not least 
because of the influx of foreign workers (interview 1996). The cost of 
living has gone up with rising prices for food, transport and 
housing, and the company does not provide good wages, benefits or 
welfare services. Working hours are long (48 hours per week), and 
sports facilities have been closed to provide land for new construc- 
tions. The working environment is very bad and hazardous, and the 
occupational health and safety committee makes only minor 
improvements. Young people do not stay long, and the company has 
a very high labour turnover. The local unionists feel that the 
company prospers without sharing the prosperity with its own 
workforce. The company discriminates against Malay and Indian 
workers while Chinese employees are well taken care of. The 
Personnel Manager is a puppet who has to take all issues to the 
General Manager. The relationship between management and the 
worksite committee is very bad, and they foresee that they will have 
to picket during the recently opened collective bargaining. 
In short, the worksite unionists see the company as financially 
driven rather than people driven. More generally, they feel that the 
Malaysian working class remains poor while the country is boom- 
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ing. The real situation is to be seen on the workfloor, they argue. You 
have to work seven days a week to survive, and not only the 
stipulated 48 hours. As one area committee member said: 'For the 
foreigners, it's a nice country, everything is beautiful. For the rich it 
is okay. For the poor working class it is hell' (interview 1996). 
The union's perception of the company is diametrically opposite 
to the picture communicated by top management. As a sign of the 
company's excellence in product and service quality, a stylized lion's 
head has been chosen as the corporate symbol, representing a 
progressive philosophy and bold approach to business. With the 
mane symbolizing the rays of the sun, the basic source of life and 
energy in Chinese thinking, 'these elements combine to symbolize 
success, growth and a sharing commitment of social responsibility in 
a competitive environment'. 
In sum, although the employees changed from the in-house union 
to the national union, industrial relations within the enterprise are 
still tense. In spite of changing company strategies, the personnel 
policy remained the same: a centralized and non-sharing policy 
subordinated the overall and centralized policy of money-making. 
The Dynamics of Enterprise Industrial Relations 
The government's discourse on in-house unionism emphasized the 
in-house perspective of employers and employees, supposing that it 
furthers company loyalty, common perceptions of goals and means, 
fair in-house sharing, and in-house problem-solving. The evidence 
presented shows that the practices of Malaysian enterprise unions 
do not fulfil the presumptions and implications of the government's 
policy of enterprise unionism. I do not contend that all enterprise 
unions are, have or will become militant unions, but I hold that 
Malaysian enterprise unions are not docile unions by nature, nor do 
they form a solid pillar for industrial harmony in Malaysia. 
Why, then, do enterprise unions resort to public industrial action, 
using soft or even hard militant means of struggle? Why do they not 
resolve all disputes in-house in collaboration with management? 
Why is Malaysian enterprise unionism not the presumed panacea for 
industrial harmony? 
The first question to be answered is whether or not enterprise 
union militancy is part of a certain dynamic of industrial relations at 
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the enterprise level. Can we inductively delineate a pattern for the 
evolution of enterprise union militancy, based on a few cases? 
In the case of company A, a Chinese-managed corporation, the 
management initiated, with the assistance of the RTU, an enterprise 
union when the employees were in the process of being unionized 
by the national union. Although a collective agreement was signed, 
nothing changed for the better, and the union leadership was simply 
thrown out of office by rank-and-file opposition. By coincidence, the 
new union leadership was approached by a new labour centre which 
provided technical advice and training in support. Being able to 
mobilize members, who were predominantly women, and staging 
pickets and gaining publicity, the enterprise union managed to put 
pressure on the authorities and the management. They succeeded in 
becoming recognized by management as a serious player. When 
collective bargaining again deadlocked, followed by state-guided 
conciliation, disagreements were settled without resorting to 
compulsory arbitration. 
In the case of the state-owned enterprise (company B), the enter- 
prise union chose a strategy of collaboration for two decades, having 
established a kind of trade-off between company and union 
interests. During the economic recession of the 1980s, mutual 
cooperation prevented forced mass retrenchment in exchange for 
zero wage increases. When the economic recession turned into 
economic boom after 1987, the union naturally expected fairness and 
just distribution of the surplus. When this did not happen, union 
members became very annoyed and acted accordingly. At first they 
changed the leadership of the union, electing a new batch of more 
critical leaders. Next, the leaders pushed hard between and during 
collective negotiations, finally resorting to picketing, mass media 
publicity and state institutions for conciliation and arbitration. 
In company C, the management initiated an enterprise union, 
when the national union tried to organize the workforce. Later on, 
management failed to support claims deemed to be legitimate by the 
union leadership. The unexpected negative stance of management, 
fuelled by inter-cultural cleavages between a Chinese management 
and a Malay union leadership, provoked the union to stage a wildcat 
strike, followed by dismissals of union leaders and the withering of 
the union. The employees turned to the national union, which was 
now recognized by management. However, tensions between the 
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management and the union locale continued, compelling local union 
leaders preparing for public action to increase pressure for improved 
pay and working conditions. In their view they were dealing with a 
very authoritarian, profit-minded employer who did not care whether 
the workers were enduring hellish working conditions or not. 
In sum, the rise and fall of militant enterprise unions seem to 
follow a trajectory, whereby management, in response to member- 
ship recruitment by a national union, initiates, controls or accepts 
the formation of an enterprise union, raising workers' expectations 
concomitantly. When these expectations are not met by the man- 
agement, members turn their back on management and the docile 
union leaders, elect new leaders or make the existing ones realize 
that they have to do something, and a period of militancy begins. 
Militancy may pay off and become part of union policy, or it may 
fail and fall with the radical union leadership, or it may escalate into 
illegal action and the dissolution of the union (through dismissals of 
leaders or deregistration). In other words, at the enterprise level, 
management seems to be unable to gain institutionalized control 
over the in-house union, as management control and rising 
dissatisfaction of union members generate counter-actions of various 
sorts, militant or not. However, enterprise union militancy does not 
necessarily continue as part of long-term union strategy. 
Hence, the next question to answer is whether or not the dynamics, 
construed by way of induction, make sense in a theoretical perspective. 
Can they be explained or deduced by existing theories on enterprise 
unionism, or do they clearly falsify common theoretical thinking? 
Enterprise Union Independence, Democracy and Militancy 
The mainstream conception of enterprise unionism, delineating 
enterprise unions as one monolithic type of trade unions, has 
recently been criticized by Benson (1996)' arguing for a more 
differentiated view on (Japanese) enterprise unions. Benson 
proposes that enterprise unions might be analysed in terms of 
structural and functional independence/dependence (of manage- 
ment). Structural independence is operationalized in terms of 
regular meetings among and between union officials and union 
members, and functional independence in terms of membership 
election of leaders, union-paid officials, and union policy, which 
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does not lend full commitment to enterprise productivity (Benson 
1996: 375-77). These two dimensions result in a typology of four 
types of unions: 
'company unions' (low structural and functional independence); 
'enterprise unions' (high structural, but low functional indepen- 
dence); 
'oligarchic unions' (high functional, but low structural indepen- 
dence); and 
'independent unions' (high structural and high functional 
independence). 
In his survey of Japanese unions Benson found that 8% could be 
classified as independent unions, nearly 50% as company unions, 
and the rest split equally between enterprise and oligarchic unions. 
Moreover, Benson showed that independent unions were more 
militant than oligarchic unions and in general more strike-prone 
than other kinds of unions. However, in terms of a broader concept 
of militancy, including not only withdrawal of labour (strikes, go- 
slows), but also overtime bans, protest meetings, posting and 
distribution of handbills, and the wearing of ribbons and armbands, 
independent unions do not differ from other types of unions (Benson 
1996: 381-82). 
Applying Benson's theory to Malaysian unions might not be 
relevant, since militancy in Malaysia has to be understood as a broad 
concept in order to make sense, because strikes for example are very 
rare, and go-slows are considered to be strikes and regulated by the 
same tough legislation. Besides, Benson's innovative theory needs to 
be reformulated due to conceptual confusion. Mixing union 
governance (election) with financial aspects (union wage payment) 
and policy aspects (productivity orientation) in one dimension 
(functional independence), and taking internal union democracy 
(communication among and between union leaders and members) 
for a separate dimension (structural independence), Benson's 
typology seems to be one of union governance (democracy) rather 
than a typology of union independence/dependence. 
By delimiting union election of leaders to denounce structural 
democracy, and by preserving internal communications between 
union leaders and members for the concept of operational democ- 
racy, we can reformulate Benson's typology of union independence 
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into a typology of union democracy, again providing for four types 
of unions: 
'democratic unions' (B's independent unions); 
'autocratic unions' (B's company unions); 
'elitist unions' (B's enterprise unions); and 
'consultative unions' (B's oligarchic unions). 
The reinterpretation acknowledges that union leadership election co- 
varies with union payment of officials' wages and with a non- 
productivity-based union policy (Benson combined these three 
factors into one: operational independence, based on factor analysis). 
Next, I propose to construct a new dimension of union independ- 
ence, differentiated from union democracy. Union independ- 
ence/dependence of management can be defined in terms of 
structural and operational aspects, too. By structural independence 
we mean that management staff (employees with management 
authority, including supervisors and foremen) are not part of union 
leadership, i.e. that the management of union affairs is not based or 
dependent on management personnel, making it structurally linked 
to the managerial hierarchy of the corporation. Operational 
independence means that the union leadership can function 
independent of management resources and services (union paid 
officials, office, communication, transports, etc). Again, we can 
outline four types of unions in terms of independence: 
'independent unions' (high structural and high operational 
independence); 
'dependent unions' (low structural and low operational independ- 
ence); 
'staff independent unions' (high on structural and low on 
operational independence); and 
'resource independent unions' (high on operational but low on 
structural independence). 
Finally, I prefer to cancel Benson's specific definition of enterprise 
unions, because it blurs the normal usage of the term. An enterprise 
union is to be understood as a trade union, organizing employees 
within the same enterprise (plant, establishment, company, 
corporation). 
The relationship between enterprise union democracy, independ- 
ence and militancy is a complicated problem area. Using our revised 
terminology, Benson's empirical material indicates that there is 
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limited co-variation between union democracy and militancy (in the 
strong sense of strikes). Studies of enterprise unions in Mexico and 
India indicate that enterprise unions relative to national unions 
might (temporarily) be very militant (strike-prone), and that this 
militancy is conditioned by union democracy, either in terms of 
election of leaders by the enterprise workforce or by intensive 
communication between leaders and members (Roxborough 1984; 
Carillo 1995; Bhattacherjee 1987; Tuman 1996). Considering 
contradictory evidence on union performance or impact in terms of 
wages and work conditions in India and Malaysia, Edgreen (1990) 
argues that the core factor is union strength, and such strength might 
come from membership mobilization due to union democracy (for a 
review of enterprise union research, see Wad 1996a). Summing up, 
my hypotheses are, first, that management-labour conflicts with 
militant actions are more likely when the union is independent and 
democratic, and second, that union independence and union 
democracy are interdependent factors. 
Reconsidering Malaysian unionism, enterprise unions are legal 
bodies defined, confined and empowered by the same labour laws 
which apply to other types of trade unions. This means that 
enterprise unions are legally defined as autonomous organizations 
vis-d-vis employers, that they consist of workmen (wage earners) and 
that they must not seek representation of management staff 
(employees with managerial, executive, confidential or security 
capacity [Ministry of Human Resources, 1995 Industrial Relations Act, 
section 91). In sum, Malaysian unions are by law defined as 
structurally independent unions. In practice, if management takes 
control of the formation of the union, the union does not need to 
seek recognition from management, thereby avoiding that manage- 
ment will complain over the (by implication, illegal) unionization of 
managerial staff. The inclusion or exclusion of managerial staff is 
thereby a prerogative of management interpretation and decision. 
Supervisors and foremen are, as lower-ranked management staff, the 
most controversial category, sometimes included, sometimes excluded 
from the trade union of 'workmen' (but legally entitled to have their 
own union, if excluded from the union of workers). All in all, most 
national unions are structurally independent, while enterprise unions 
might often start as structurally and operationally dependent unions, 
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being initiated by management and led by supervisors or executives 
with management support for union activities. 
By law, trade union leaders must be elected by taking a secret 
ballot in accordance with the rules of the union (MHR 1995 Trade 
Union Act, section 40), but the law does not stipulate election 
procedures at decentralized levels of the trade union (e.g. worksite 
or area committees), which are within the remit of the leadership of 
the particular union. When the election of the executive committee of 
the trade union is legally bound to be carried out by secret ballot 
among the union membership, the enterprise union leadership must 
be elected by union members of the enterprise workforce. By 
implication and legally speaking, Malaysian trade union law secures 
structural democracy in enterprise unions. Moreover, management 
is legally obliged to abstain from intervening in internal trade union 
matters. Using legal methods, a management will not in the long run 
be able to determine the leadership of an enterprise union when 
rank-and-file employees form the majority of membership and 
mobilize around their own candidates. 
Contextualized by such legal institutions, it is likely that militancy 
is explained by changing enterprise unions in terms of independence 
and governance. The militancy of the enterprise union of company A 
came after the union changed from an elitist union to a democratic 
union with the 'revolution' in 1989, transforming the union from a 
dependent union into a structural independent union, still depend- 
ent on management resources for operation, but seeking alternative 
resources from an external labour centre. One hypothesis could be 
that in order to sustain the policy of contested bargaining, the union 
needs to establish operational independence. In company B, the 
union began as and remained a democratic union, which demon- 
strated its capacity for leadership transformation in the 1990s. A 
small intermezzo took place in the 1980s, which disqualified 
management staff (supervisors) from holding leadership positions in 
the union. When the union turned to militancy, it cannot be 
explained by changes in union democracy or independence. It 
remained as a democratic and structurally independent union, 
lacking operational independence (although it had an external office 
in its own building, beside having an office at the factory site for 
daily activities). The switch to militancy followed a perceived 
deviation from a norm of reciprocity in management-labour 
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relations. But the militant leaders did not take the policy through to 
victory, and the union returned to a policy of collaboration after the 
radical leaders left the company. The union appeared to be opera- 
tionally dependent on the company, and although this fits with the 
old management style, it may not fit with the new and more 
aggressive, business-oriented management. 
In company C, the union turned to militancy on an ethnic issue, 
seemingly without prior transformation of its low operational 
independence. It was probably an elitist union where leaders did not 
secure broad and daily support for the enterprise union. Without 
having established operational democracy, the union withered after 
the wildcat strike and the sacking of the union leadership. Dissatis- 
fied with pay and working conditions, members resigned to join the 
national union, which the management now recognized as repre- 
senting the workforce. Still, without having achieved any significant 
improvements, the worksite committee of the national union is 
taking a tougher stance against the management, paving the way for 
militant action in future negotiations. How this is looked upon by 
the HQs of the national union is another matter. The employees have 
become part of an independent national industrial union, where a 
wildcat strike in company C can put the entire national union at risk. 
In sum, union democracy and union independence do explain part of 
the story of enterprise union militancy, but union policy is also 
conditioned by management policy, power and ethno-cultural outlook. 
Management's Industrial Relations Policy 
The key dimensions of management's policy is whether it adheres to 
a policy of collective or individual contract negotiations, and 
whether it takes an authoritarian or cooperative attitude to man- 
agement-labour relations. The traditional Western pattern of 
collective bargaining at company, industry or national level has been 
based on a management priority for collective cooperation, evolving 
through historical and militant struggles with large-scale strikes and 
lockouts. With the new ideology of human resource management, 
managers prefer individualized, cooperative relations, based on 
direct employee involvement, and bypassing union interventions or 
mediation. In develophg countries, the traditional personnel policy has 
been based on individualistic and authoritarian management of labour, 
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not least in small companies, owned and operated by family members, 
in particular Chinese families. Finally, authoritarian and collectivist 
approaches are found within societies where collectivism and authori- 
tarianism are basic institutions (e.g. in ethnic Malay communities). 
Latiff argues that management's labour policy is the decisive 
factor for the evolution of enterprise union into collaboration or 
militancy (Latiff 1988). It is my contention that the course of enter- 
prise industrial relations is conditioned, but not solely determined, by 
the management's policy and practice, making militancy less likely 
with management adhering to cooperative and collective policies of 
enterprise industrial relations and personnel management. 
The two managements of the Chinese-controlled and managed 
companies (A and C) stuck to authoritarian and individualistic 
policies. When confronted with the national union, they preferred to 
establish an in-house union, and succeeded. However, they did not 
change their management style and the union did not bring any 
improvements. This policy caused a rapid deterioration in the 
management-labour relationship, sparking off membership mobiliza- 
tion around a new and militant leadership in company A, and an 
illegal wildcat strike and the fall of the union leadership in company 
C. While the enterprise union sustained its position in company A, 
the national union came back in company C. In no company did the 
management change the company's personnel policy or industrial 
relations approach, although they have adapted to changing 
relations of power (accepting a compromise before arbitration in 
company A, and negotiation with a national union in company C). 
Both these companies changed from non-listed, private and 
personally (family) owned firms to public listed corporations, still 
with the family in firm control of shares and executive management 
positions. Both companies are market leaders within their fields, 
using state-of-the art technology, producing for domestic and export 
markets, and diversifying into other sectors. Both are subject to the 
overall policy of ethno-economic restructuring and have political 
connections to high-ranking authorities. The top managers keep 
direct control of the personnel departments, treating the executives 
as puppets (in the eyes of the union). The Personnel Managers, being 
from the same ethnic background as the majority of employees, 
articulated more employee-oriented opinions (collective cooperation, 
and human resource management) if not directly criticizing the 
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personnel policy of the top management. Finally, both top manage- 
ments pursued an anti-union policy, perceiving labour primarily as a 
cost which needed to be rationalized while increasing productivity. 
With such management policies, conflictual management-labour 
relations will continue at the enterprise level, preconditioning steady 
union militancy. 
In the case of company B, the state-led management followed a 
cooperative, collectivist style, based on Japanese management 
philosophy, Malaysian nationalism and Malay ethic loyalty. 
However, when a new management took over after years of bad 
times and the government chose a more business-like policy 
(liberalization, deregulation, privatization) during the economic 
crisis of the mid-1980~~ things changed at the enterprise level, too. 
Without meeting the norm of reciprocity and fairness, the union 
members changed the collaborative leadership for a more militant 
one. But faced with tough management negotiation and business 
restructuring, the militant leaders gave up or fell with the closing of 
two old plants. Meanwhile, the old union strategy of collaboration in 
a realist perspective returned, but its fate depends on the future 
policy of the management, the market conditions, and the ability of 
the union leaders to extract concessions. Moreover the company 
does not seem to have the same strong market position as the two 
other companies (A and C). 
In sum, management policy is very important for the policy and 
practice of enterprise unions. Taking an anti-union, authoritarian 
attitude to management-labour relations, management can initially 
form an enterprise union as it prefers, but it cannot keep influencing 
the union without providing fair deals for the union members in the 
long term. Sticking to traditional Chinese business conceptions of 
labour-management relations, the Chinese-owned and managed 
companies became hotbeds for sustained militancy. A tradition for 
more collectivist cooperation in state-owned companies is under 
review by management and higher up in the state, making the 
operational management more inclined to authoritarian decision- 
making, including rationalization, downsizing and unfair offers to 
the employees during collective bargaining. 
In all companies corporate management is changing, but nowhere 
is human resource management on the agenda at the top level. 
Authoritarianism prevails in either individualistic or collectivist 
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forms, and this breeds industrial conflicts and militancy. With 
legally founded structural democracy and independence, Malaysian 
enterprise unions turn to new leaders and militant methods when 
the majority of members feel cheated or unfairly treated. Although 
workers are in-house union members, they compare their lot with 
the fate of the company and the employees of other similar compa- 
nies. And although enterprise unions are often operationally 
dependent unions, they seek support from external union networks 
and structures in order to improve their strength. 
Conclusion 
Having established and refined a legally binding industrial relations 
system, based on conciliation and compulsory arbitration, the 
Malaysian government secured a framework for industrial peace and 
stability from the early 1980s. But industrial peace and stability are not 
equivalent to industrial harmony and productivity improvements. In 
order to achieve rapid and qualitatively upgraded industrialization by 
means of industrial collaboration and productivity improvements, the 
Malaysian government turned to the Japanese model for manage- 
ment-labour regulation. Within this discourse enterprise unionism 
became adopted and advocated as a panacea for industrial harmony, 
providing an in-house perspective for industrial problem-solving 
between the directly involved partners, generating loyalty, cooperation, 
productivity and mutual benefits. 
The evidence available and the few cases presented falsify this 
general perception of Malaysian enterprise unionism. Enterprise 
unions are not by necessity management-dependent, docile and 
subordinate bodies of worker representation. They are more 
complex organizations, varying in terms of independence and 
democracy. In Malaysia, they are legally constituted as structurally 
independent and democratic organizations, and these properties are 
explored by workers when managers or enterprise union leaders do 
not deliver the promised benefits. Authoritarian managements, 
therefore, sooner or later face more independent and democratic 
enterprise unions, taking militant action if necessary, although the 
cultural outlook might still be determined by ethnic identities and 
norms for fairness (sharing good and bad times). The inter-cultural 
relationship at the Malaysian enterprises seems to move in a 
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direction where the workforce becomes multi-ethnic with a Malay 
majority while the management will continue to stay with its ethnic 
business community, be it Malay, Chinese, Indian or various foreign 
configurations (see Wad 1997a). This scenario provides a very 
ambiguous picture of class and ethno-cultural structures and 
dynamics, which interact with the dynamics of the enterprise 
industrial relations. 
The policy of enterprise unionism does not explain why Malay- 
sian industrial relations are very peaceful in terms of strikes. This 
situation is the outcome of the establishment of a fine-tuned system 
of conciliation and arbitration which was completed around 1980. 
However, beneath the calm surface of industrial peace, industrial 
disharmony prevails in many enterprises, and this may hamper the 
quest for increased productivity and other industrial improvements. 
The policy for enterprise unionism does not seem to be the pana- 
cea for industrial harmony in Malaysia, because enterprise unions do 
not by necessity further industrial harmony either in Malaysia or in 
other developing societies (Wad 1996a). Enterprise unionism is a 
more complex phenomenon which is still embedded in rnispercep- 
tions and misinterpretations - inside Malaysia and outside, among 
politicians, trade unionists and social scientists as well. The myths of 
enterprise unionism seem to be a global legacy of Western trade 
union history. 
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